Note: The following article concerns the resolution of a case that had previously been covered by LRIS, “City Council Had Authority To Fire Police Officer After High-Speed Chase,” published in the January 2025 issue of PSLN.
Gregory Moliere, a police officer with the City of Buffalo Police Department in Texas, engaged in a high-speed chase while a civilian was riding in his patrol vehicle, despite department policies prohibiting such conduct. This chase resulted in an accident that damaged the patrol vehicle. Moliere reported the incident to the City’s police chief, who issued Moliere a written reprimand. Approximately two weeks later, during a regularly scheduled meeting, the City Council went into a closed session to discuss Moliere. They subsequently reconvened in open session and voted to terminate Moliere. Moliere then filed suit seeking a declaration that the City Council’s action was without legal authority and sought to compel his reinstatement to the force. In addition, he alleged the City Council’s action deprived him of “limited due process” under the City’s policies and procedures.
Moliere’s initial suit named the City of Buffalo, its mayor, Jerrod Jones, and all members of the City Council, in both their official and individual capacities, as defendants. The City Council members were reportedly never served and never appeared in the trial court. The City and Jones answered the lawsuit and filed a combined plea to the jurisdiction and motion for summary judgment. The trial court granted this motion and dismissed all of Moliere’s claims against the City and Jones. Additionally, the trial court found that the City Council had the authority to terminate Moliere.
Moliere appealed to the Court of Appeals, which reversed the trial court’s decision. The Court of Appeals held that there was a fact issue as to whether the City Council had the authority to terminate Moliere. The Court noted that while the City Council had passed an ordinance requiring City Council approval of hiring police officers, it had not passed a specific ordinance expressly addressing the termination of those officers. The Court of Appeals found that the City’s employee manual and the policy and procedure manual of the police department were ambiguous regarding the City Council’s authority to terminate officers and remanded the case to the trial court for further proceedings. The Court of Appeals did not address a separate assertion of Moliere’s claim alleging a violation of his due process rights. The City and Jones then filed a petition with the Supreme Court of Texas for review.
The Supreme Court of Texas reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals. The Court determined that the city was a Type A general-law municipality under the Texas Local Government Code, which delineates the authority of municipalities. The Court noted that the State’s law “expressly confers” powers upon such municipalities through the Local Government Code. Section 341.001(a) gives “the governing body of a Type A general-law municipality” the authority to “establish and regulate a municipal police force.” The Court found that the City Council is the governing body, and that this section “unquestionably establishes the City Council’s authority to ‘establish and regulate’ the City’s police force.” Furthermore, the Court asserted that subsections (b) and (c), “together with the ordinance requiring the City Council’s approval of the hiring of all officers, confirm more specifically the City Council’s authority to supervise officer hiring and employment requirements.”
The Court rejected Moliere’s argument that the police chief is the only person authorized to hire and fire a police officer unless and until the City Council adopts an ordinance granting itself that authority. The Court explained that subsection (c) of Section 341.001, which provides that police officers “serve at the pleasure of the governing body,” only applies to terminations without cause. The Court concluded that, “firing an officer because he has violated official policy or otherwise has demonstrated a performance-related deficiency is necessarily part of subsection (a)’s express authorization of ‘regulating a municipal police force.’” Because the City Council was authorized to terminate Moliere’s employment, the Court determined Moliere did not properly plead an ultra vires claim, which would strip the City Council members of their governmental immunity. The Supreme Court therefore reversed the Court of Appeals and reinstated the trial court’s dismissal of claims based on the alleged lack of authority to fire Moliere.
The Supreme Court remanded the case to the Court of Appeals, recognizing that Moliere had made a separate due process claim that had not been reached by that court. “Moliere separately asserted that the City Council violated his due process rights by failing to follow the disciplinary procedures in the police department’s policy manual as well as the statutory process governing complaints against law enforcement officers.” The Supreme Court further explained that governmental immunity “does not bar a suit that seeks to bring government officials into compliance with statutory or constitutional provisions,” and the Court of Appeals was in a better position to determine whether the due process claim was meritorious.
City of Buffalo v. Moliere, 2024 Tex. LEXIS 1108 (Tex. 2024).