The Missouri Supreme Court suspended attorney Ryan Christopher McCarty from the practice of law for disclosing confidential client information after his termination as associate general counsel for the Kansas City Police Department (KCPD). McCarty began working for the KCPD in June 2022 and was terminated less than six months later. During his employment, he routinely forwarded internal KCPD documents from his work account to his personal email and saved confidential files, including legal memoranda and personnel materials, to external storage. On the evening of his termination, he began sending these records to outside parties — including federal and state law enforcement agencies, elected officials, journalists, and private attorneys. Within hours, he distributed an eight-page document titled “Letter to the World” to more than 100 recipients, attaching 372 pages of KCPD internal communications. He used modified Department letterhead identifying himself as “Former Associate General Counsel, Kansas City Police Department.”
The materials he released included privileged attorney-client correspondence, legal analyses, draft pleadings, and internal memoranda discussing personnel discipline, discrimination complaints, and pending litigation. Several attachments involved ongoing use-of-force and officer-misconduct investigations, as well as records reflecting legal advice provided to KCPD command staff. In his letter, McCarty accused the KCPD’s leadership of corruption, racial and gender discrimination, and obstruction of justice, asserting that KCPD officials were concealing unlawful conduct and that public exposure was necessary to prompt federal intervention. He characterized his disclosures as an act of civic duty to “protect the citizens of Kansas City.”
Following these disclosures, Missouri’s Office of Chief Disciplinary Counsel (OCDC) opened an investigation. McCarty admitted to sending the documents but contended that he did so in good faith, believing he was acting as a whistleblower to expose misconduct. The OCDC filed formal charges alleging violations of Rules 4-1.9(c)(1) and (2) of the Missouri Rules of Professional Conduct, which prohibit an attorney from using or revealing information relating to the representation of a former client to that client’s disadvantage, except as the rules permit.
A disciplinary hearing panel concluded that McCarty had indeed violated his duty of confidentiality but recommended only a public reprimand. The OCDC rejected the panel’s proposed discipline, and instead recommended that McCarty’s license to practice law be suspended indefinitely with no leave to apply for reinstatement for one year.
The Missouri Supreme Court agreed with OCDC, and imposed its recommended, more severe, sanction.
The Court found that McCarty’s conduct demonstrated a knowing and deliberate disregard for his professional obligations and warranted suspension. The Court explained that Rule 4-1.9(c) codifies the enduring duty of confidentiality owed to former clients and that McCarty’s disclosures directly harmed KCPD by revealing internal deliberations and exposing sensitive personnel and legal matters.
The Court uniformly rejected McCarty’s asserted defenses and justifications for the disclosure.
The Court first rejected McCarty’s reliance on Rule 4-1.13(b), which permits current organizational lawyers to report corporate misconduct “to the highest authority” within the organization. Because McCarty was no longer employed by KCPD when he sent his letter, the rule did not apply. Even if McCarty had not been terminated, and the rule did apply, the Court explained that his drastic and widespread disclosure did not conform to the rule’s limited and internal reporting mechanism.
The Court also rejected McCarty’s argument that disclosure was “required by law.” He contended that the materials contained potential exculpatory or impeachment information subject to disclosure under Brady and Giglio. The Court explained that those constitutional doctrines impose disclosure duties on prosecutors in criminal cases, not on attorneys representing law enforcement agencies in a civil capacity. Moreover, Brady and Giglio apply only to evidence material to guilt or punishment and require disclosure through appropriate judicial processes — not unilateral public release. McCarty, who was not a prosecutor and did not represent the State in criminal proceedings, had no authority or obligation under those cases to disseminate privileged materials. The Court added that even if he believed misconduct existed, his ethical obligations required him to address the matter internally or through lawful reporting mechanisms rather than by publicly releasing client confidences.
The Court further rejected his invocation of the Missouri Sunshine Law, noting that the statute governs agency responses to public-records requests and does not authorize individual employees to unilaterally disclose privileged or closed records. McCarty’s mass transmission of confidential material was therefore neither compelled nor protected by law.
Likewise, the Court found no merit to McCarty’s First Amendment and whistleblower defenses. While government employees retain certain free-speech protections, the Court emphasized that lawyers are officers of the court who accept limits on speech concerning client confidences. Public exposure of privileged materials, even to reveal alleged misconduct, falls outside the bounds of protected speech and constitutes professional misconduct. Nor did Missouri’s public-employee whistleblower statute apply, as McCarty’s disclosures were not made through authorized reporting channels.
In assessing sanctions, the Court considered both aggravating and mitigating factors. It found that McCarty knowingly violated his duty of confidentiality, caused potential harm to his former client, and refused to acknowledge the impropriety of his conduct. At the same time, the Court noted his cooperation with the disciplinary process and absence of prior discipline. Drawing on the American Bar Association’s Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions, the Court determined that indefinite suspension was necessary to protect the public, preserve confidence in the legal profession, and deter similar misconduct.
Accordingly, the Court ordered that McCarty be indefinitely suspended from the practice of law, with no leave to apply for reinstatement for one year.
In re McCarty, No. SC-100905, 2025 WL 2053115 (Mo. July 22, 2025).