Matthew Keil, a deputy sheriff in Chesapeake, Virginia, was demoted following an internal affairs investigation into a jailhouse incident involving inmates and subordinate deputies he supervised. After his demotion, Keil requested access to records related to the investigation, including interviews and video evidence, under both the Virginia Freedom of Information Act (VFOIA) and the Government Data Collection and Dissemination Practices Act (the Government Data Act). The Sheriff’s Office produced some materials but withheld the internal affairs records, asserting statutory exemptions. Lower courts rejected Keil’s claims in full.
The Supreme Court of Virginia affirmed in part and reversed in part. It agreed that Keil had no right to the requested records under VFOIA because the records fell within statutory exemptions for law enforcement investigative materials. The Court therefore upheld dismissal of the VFOIA claim.
The Court reached a different conclusion under the Government Data Act, which governs access to “personal information” maintained by government entities. The statute allows an individual, defined as a “data subject,” to access information about himself that “is indexed or may be located” using his name or other identifying details. The lower courts held that Keil was not a “data subject” because the internal affairs files were not indexed by employee name and were instead organized by year and case number.
The Supreme Court rejected that reasoning. The Court explained that the statute’s definition is disjunctive: information need not be formally indexed by name if it “may be located” using identifying information. The Court emphasized that this phrase requires no specialized search method. As the Court explained, the inquiry is simply whether it is reasonable to look through available files and find records that reference the individual. The Sheriff’s Office practice of keeping internal affairs records in separate, non-indexed files did not remove those records from the statute’s reach.
The Court also held that internal affairs records qualify as “personal information” because they include information about an officer’s employment record and “things done by or to” the individual. That broad definition encompasses disciplinary investigations even when the records are not part of a formal personnel file.
Applying those principles, the Court concluded that the Sheriff’s Office violated the Government Data Act by refusing to provide Keil access to internal affairs records relating to his conduct. The fact that the records were kept in “secret” internal affairs files rather than indexed personnel files did not defeat Keil’s statutory rights.
The Court remanded the case for in camera review of the records to determine which portions contain Keil’s personal information and must be disclosed, with appropriate redactions for unrelated material.
Keil v. O’Sullivan, Record No. 240824, 2026 WL 388510 (Va. Feb. 12, 2026).