The Estate of Donovan Lewis brought a federal civil rights action against the City of Columbus, Ohio, and the Columbus police chief, alleging that Lewis’s fatal shooting by a police officer resulted from an official policy or custom of racially discriminatory policing and excessive force. The complaint sought damages and broad injunctive relief, including reforms aimed at disciplinary systems, investigations, whistleblower processes, and pension consequences for officers. The Fraternal Order of Police, Capital City Lodge #9, the exclusive bargaining representative for approximately 1,800 sworn Columbus police officers, moved to intervene under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24 – that is, to become a party to the lawsuit. The district court denied intervention, reasoning that the FOP did not have a substantial legal interest in the matter, and that its interests would be adequately represented by the City. The district court’s denial was without prejudice, and the district court remained open to the possibility that if the City were found liable on the merits, the FOP could later intervene in the remedy phase.
The FOP appealed and the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed.
The Court concluded that FOP satisfied the requirements for intervention as of right under Rule 24(a)(2). The central dispute concerned whether FOP had a “substantial legal interest” in the liability/merits phase of the case, not merely in potential remedies. The Court emphasized that the Estate’s Monell theory attacked Columbus police policies and practices that “largely flow from the authority, parameters, and limitations in the CBA.” The complaint alleged that features such as disciplinary structures, investigative procedures, and other employment-related policies enabled unconstitutional policing. Those provisions were the product of collective bargaining, and the FOP is statutorily obligated under Ohio law to represent officers in matters involving wages, hours, and terms and conditions of employment, including discipline, investigations, and terminations. The Court held that the FOP’s interest in defending those provisions and protecting officer safety and contractual rights was direct and substantial, not merely ideological.
The Court also found that the FOP’s interests could be impaired if intervention were denied. Findings during the liability phase about the role of challenged policies in any alleged constitutional violation would shape the factual record presented at the remedial phase. Excluding the FOP from the liability phase would prevent it from developing evidence and legal arguments bearing on the policies’ operation and necessity, placing it at a practical disadvantage in later protecting its interests.
Finally, the Court held that the City might not adequately represent the FOP’s interests. Although both sought to defeat liability, the City had historically been adverse to FOP in collective bargaining and had previously sought to modify or remove some of the same contractual provisions at issue. Public statements by City officials criticizing union-backed policies further suggested potential divergence. Because the FOP needed to show only the City’s representation “may be” inadequate, this showing sufficed.
Having met all Rule 24(a) requirements, the Court found that the FOP was entitled to intervene as of right. The Court therefore reversed the denial of intervention.
Estate of Lewis v. City of Columbus, 2025 WL 3120050 (6th Cir. Nov. 7, 2025).