Kady-Ann Cox, an African-American police officer employed by the Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority (SEPTA), filed suit after SEPTA Police Chief Thomas Nestel terminated her employment in 2019. Cox alleged that the termination was motivated by race discrimination and asserted claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act, and 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1983. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania granted summary judgment for SEPTA and Nestel, and the Third Circuit affirmed.
The dispute arose from a September 2019 encounter in which Cox responded to a report of a disturbance involving a woman, Tysheona Howard. Cox approached Howard and grabbed her shoulder to escort her away from the area. Howard struck Cox, and a fight ensued until other officers intervened and pulled Howard away. After Howard spit at Cox and attempted to lunge toward her again, Cox approached Howard and struck her even though other officers had already separated the two.
SEPTA’s Internal Affairs Unit investigated the incident and interviewed Cox three times. The investigation concluded that she had violated SEPTA policies governing both excessive force and honesty during internal investigations. The Police Board of Inquiry upheld those findings, determining that Cox’s statements were “clearly inconsistent with the facts discovered during the investigation” and that she had “lied … in her Internal Affairs interviews.” Nestel stated that he terminated Cox based on the Board’s recommendation.
The investigation also had consequences outside of SEPTA. The Philadelphia District Attorney’s Office maintains a Giglio list of officers who have been found to have made untruthful statements in internal investigations because such credibility findings must be disclosed in criminal cases. Officers placed on the Giglio list are barred from testifying in court. SEPTA notified the District Attorney’s Office of the findings from the internal investigation, and Cox was placed on the list, making her ineligible to testify.
Cox relied on indirect evidence to support her discrimination claims, so the Court analyzed them under the burden-shifting framework of McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green. Under that framework, a plaintiff must first establish a prima facie case of discrimination, including showing that she was qualified for the position in question.
The Third Circuit agreed with the district court that Cox could not satisfy that requirement. The Court explained that a plaintiff’s subjective belief that she was qualified is insufficient where she fails to meet a “minimum requirement needed to hold [the] position.” Nestel testified that the ability to testify in court is a core responsibility of a SEPTA police officer because otherwise “any arrests that [the officer] would make would be lost.” Once Cox was placed on the District Attorney’s Giglio list and barred from testifying, she could no longer perform that essential function of the job.
The Court analogized the situation to cases in which employees become unqualified after losing a required credential. Just as an employee who loses a necessary security clearance cannot establish that he remains qualified for a position requiring that clearance, an officer who cannot testify in court cannot meet the basic qualifications of a policing job. Because Cox could not show that she remained qualified for the position, she failed to establish a prima facie case of discrimination.
The Court therefore affirmed summary judgment on all claims.
Cox v. Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority, No. 25-1100, 2026 WL 195004 (3d Cir. Jan. 26, 2026) (not precedential).