Camille Smicz, a longtime 911 dispatcher for the Deschutes County, Oregon 911 Service District, sought workers’ compensation benefits related to her duties as a dispatcher. “Over her 20 years as a dispatcher, [Smicz] assisted by phone with many alarming and disturbing situations,” and in filing her claim, she asserted that the “‘continued exposure to trauma and critical incidents’ led to an occupational disease of ‘PTSD, secondary trauma, [and] cumulative stress disorder.’” After the County denied the claim, an administrative law judge and the Oregon Workers’ Compensation Board concluded that Smicz failed to establish entitlement to the statutory PTSD presumption. The Oregon Court of Appeals affirmed.
The case turned on the meaning of Oregon Revised Statute (ORS) 656.802(7)(b), which provides a rebuttable presumption of compensability if a worker proves, “through a preponderance of persuasive medical evidence from a psychiatrist or psychologist,” that she more likely than not meets the diagnostic criteria for PTSD or acute stress disorder. Smicz argued that the statute required the factfinder to consider only her medical evidence in determining whether the presumption applied.
The Court rejected that interpretation. It held that the statutory text permits consideration of all persuasive medical evidence, including evidence offered by the County. The Court explained that the phrase “preponderance of the evidence” is a term of art that requires weighing competing evidence to determine which side has the stronger case. Reading the statute to exclude contrary evidence would improperly insert a limitation that the legislature did not include.
Applying that interpretation, the Court upheld the Board’s conclusion that Smicz failed to meet her burden. The Board had found that the opinion of Smicz’s expert, who diagnosed PTSD after a limited review of her history, was less persuasive than the opinions of two other experts who concluded that her symptoms did not satisfy the diagnostic criteria for PTSD and were better explained by other conditions. The Board emphasized that Smicz’s expert had not reviewed significant portions of her medical history, including prior diagnoses and non-work-related stressors, which undermined the reliability of his conclusions.
The Court also rejected Smicz’s argument that the Board’s decision lacked substantial evidence. It explained that appellate review does not permit reweighing the evidence but instead asks whether a reasonable factfinder could reach the same conclusion. Given the competing medical opinions and the Board’s explanation for crediting the County’s experts, the Court held that the decision was supported by substantial evidence and reason.
Because Smicz failed to establish, by a preponderance of persuasive medical evidence, that she met the statutory criteria for PTSD, she was not entitled to the presumption of compensability, and the denial of her claim was affirmed.
In the Matter of the Compensation of Smicz, No. A182542, 2026 WL 383026 (Or. Ct. App. Feb. 11, 2026).