Leroy Williams, a special police officer with the District of Columbia’s Department of General Services (DGS), was terminated in August 2019 for conduct relating to two unauthorized traffic stops the previous March. Upon receiving a final notice of separation, Williams was presented with three options for appeal: (1) filing personally with the Office of Employee Appeals; (2) having his union, the Fraternal Order of Police, file a grievance; or (3) personally filing a grievance under D.C. personnel regulations. Williams chose to have the FOP file a grievance on his behalf, as permitted by the CBA.
When the FOP and DGS were unable to settle the grievance, the FOP decided to advance the grievance to arbitration, again under the terms of the agreement. The Arbitrator ultimately sided with DGS, finding that DGS had just cause to terminate Williams, and had followed all applicable laws, rules, and regulations. The FOP then sought a review of the Arbitrator’s decision by the Public Employee Relations Board, which found “no cause to modify, set aside, or remand the award.” The FOP then petitioned the Superior Court of the District of Columbia for review, which affirmed PERB’s decision. After counsel for the FOP withdrew from the proceedings, Williams, acting on his own behalf, appealed the Superior Court’s decision.
The District of Columbia Court of Appeals held that Williams lacked standing to appeal the arbitration award and dismissed his appeal.
The Court found that because the CBA granted only the FOP the authority to advance a grievance to arbitration, only the FOP had the corresponding standing to appeal an adverse decision, unless the FOP had breached its duty of fair representation.
In reaching this decision, the Court first recognized that as a rule, “an individual employee lacks direct control over a union’s actions taken on his behalf.” In the context of workplace disputes, the Court found that “the union typically has broad discretion in its decision whether and how to pursue an employee’s grievance against an employer.” Furthermore, the Court found that vesting control of the grievance process in the union serves the interests of both unions and employers, where the union can actively participate in the administration of the contract and employers benefit from “limiting the choice of remedies available to aggrieved employees.”
The Court noted that the relevant collective bargaining agreement explicitly states that “only the FOP may advance a grievance to arbitration,” and it therefore follows that only the FOP was empowered to appeal an adverse arbitration ruling to this Court. The Court noted that it had not previously had an opportunity to consider this question, but examination of decisions of other jurisdictions “shows a uniform line of decisions disallowing individual appeals unless the collective bargaining agreement expressly authorizes individual employees to arbitrate or the FOP is found to have breached its duty of fair representation.”
The Court dismissed Williams’ argument that he had standing because he had the FOP’s backing. Williams argued that the FOP’s counsel advised him of his rights to appeal, and that the FOP “sought representation for Officer Williams on reply,” thus “indicating its express authorization of this appeal.” The Court found this argument unpersuasive, stating “there is nothing in the record indicating what counsel for the FOP said to Williams prior to withdrawing from the case, or whether the FOP indeed gave its ‘express authorization of this appeal.’”
The Court further explained that “appellate review is limited to matters appearing in the record before us, and we cannot base our review upon statements of counsel which are unsupported by that record.” Even if these claims were supported by the record, the Court found that Williams “points to no authority that would allow him to ‘file the opening brief on behalf of the FOP’” because the FOP must be represented by its counsel. The Court emphasized that standing doctrine “embraces several judicially self-imposed limits on the exercise of jurisdiction, such as the general prohibition on a litigant’s raising another person’s legal rights”. The Court similarly rejected Williams’ argument that he had standing because he and the FOP “operated in lockstep,” stating that “whether or not the FOP helped Williams obtain counsel after he filed his opening brief without the assistance of an attorney has no bearing on whether he had the legal right to appeal in the first place.”
Williams v. D.C. Dep’t of Gen. Servs., 2024 D.C. App. LEXIS 406 (D.C., 2024).