In the summer of 2021, Deputy Sheriff R.L. and his wife attended a party together where R.L. drank and became angry. After they returned home, R.L.’s wife contacted friends and told them that R.L. was drunk and belligerent, having put her in handcuffs and threatened to arrest her. The friends notified the Martin County Sheriff’s Department, where R.L. was a deputy sheriff, to report the incident. Five officers, including the elected sheriff and the chief deputy, met to discuss the situation. Unbeknownst to them, R.L.’s wife had left the house and was in her car. When she observed the sheriffs, she pulled over to speak with them. While she was talking to the sheriffs, R.L. arrived at the same intersection in his assigned sheriff’s vehicle. A deputy smelled alcohol on R.L.’s breath and administered a preliminary breath test. The test indicated that R.L.’s blood-alcohol concentration was nearly twice the legal limit. R.L. then agreed to a chemical blood-alcohol test that also showed R.L.’s blood-alcohol concentration to be above the legal limit. R.L. was arrested, and charged with misdemeanor driving while intoxicated, although the charges were later dismissed.
Before R.L. could expunge his arrest record, he received a letter from the law enforcement training board that it “learned of an event that may lead to the revocation of your Indiana Law Enforcement Basic Training Certification and authority to act as a law enforcement officer and voted to send notice of written charges for revocation of your certificate.” The Board alleged that R.L. “engaged in conduct that meets the elements of Criminal Confinement and Operating a Vehicle with an alcohol concentration equivalent of 0.08 or more” and informed R.L. that he could request an evidentiary hearing to contest the charges.
Before responding to the Board’s letter, R.L. petitioned the trial court to expunge his arrest record. The Court granted the request and ordered that no “records for this arrest be placed or retained in any state central repository for criminal history information or in any other alphabetically arranged criminal history information system” and that his arrest record be “excluded from public access.” Armed with the Court’s order, R.L. demanded that the Board drop its charges, citing the expungement statute’s anti-discrimination provision, which bars “refusing to grant or renew a license, permit, or certificate necessary to engage in any activity, occupation, or profession” based on an expunged arrest record. The Board refused.
R.L. then petitioned the Court for further relief without naming or serving the Board, seeking a declaration and an injunction against the Board, which the Court granted. The Court issued a judgment declaring the Board’s proceedings unlawful and enjoining it “from using facts from R.L.’s expunged arrest as a basis to revoke or deny him his license to act as a law enforcement officer.” The Board intervened and moved to vacate the Court’s order, arguing that the Board was not served, that R.L. did not exhaust administrative remedies, and that the merits did not support the relief awarded. The trial court vacated its first order, but issued a second order, again barring the Board “from using any and all facts from R.L.’s expunged arrest case as a basis to revoke or deny to him his license to act as a law enforcement officer.” The Board appealed, and the Court of Appeals reversed, finding that while the Board “must not consider the expunged arrest records in its proceedings, it may consider independent evidence of the facts underlying those arrest records.” R.L. then sought transfer to the Supreme Court of Indiana, which was granted.
The Supreme Court of Indiana held that the trial court erred in granting R.L.’s request for declaratory and injunctive relief and reversed the trial court’s judgment. “We hold that R.L.’s declaratory judgment action in the trial court was premature because he did not exhaust available remedies before the Board. Contrary to R.L.’s arguments, neither the declaratory judgment act nor the expungement statute gives him another route to sue in court; he must follow the Administrative Orders and Procedures Act’s path.”
The Court observed that R.L. circumvented the Board’s proceedings by going to court rather than attending the evidentiary hearing provided for under the Administrative Orders and Procedures Act. The Court noted that “the hearing statute gives R.L. many opportunities to challenge any misconduct allegations. If the Board decides not to discipline R.L., he keeps his basic-training certificate and need not seek relief in court.” Additionally, the Court noted that, “if the Board instead revokes his certificate, R.L. may challenge the Board’s decision on judicial review,” but only after the Board reaches a final decision.
The Court rejected R.L.’s arguments that he was excused from complying with the Administrative Orders and Procedures Act because the expungement statute or the declaratory judgment act authorized his action. Because neither the antidiscrimination provision nor the declaratory judgment act permitted R.L. to bypass the available remedies before the Board, the Supreme Court held that R.L.’s lawsuit was premature.
The Supreme Court reversed the trial court’s judgment and remanded the case with instructions to dismiss R.L.’s declaratory judgment action.
Indiana Law Enforcement Training Board v. R.L., 2024 Ind. LEXIS 725 (Ind., 2024).