Police Departments, Officers Have No Duty To Curb Off-Duty Alcohol Consumption

Written on 03/07/2025
LRIS

In July 2019, Brent Bartlett, a Ju­neau, Alaska Police Department (JPD) officer, rear-ended Arlene Tripp’s car while Bartlett was off duty. Bartlett was found to be severely intoxicated, with a blood alcohol content of 0.239, nearly three times the legal limit, and subsequently pled guilty to driving under the influence and assault.

The court documents reveal Bart­lett had a history of struggling with alcohol abuse and PTSD, stemming from prior military service. He was in a relationship with another JPD officer, Hannah Malone, at the time. Malone was aware that Bartlett struggled with alcohol use and regularly drove after drinking heavily, yet she did not report his behavior to the JPD.

The JPD, in turn, had no knowledge of Bartlett’s mental health or alco­hol-related issues before the accident. The JPD’s rules of conduct prohibited off-duty officers from becoming in­toxicated to a point of “obnoxious or offensive behavior which discredits them or the Department or renders the members unfit to report for their next regular tour of duty.” The City and Borough of Juneau also had a “Drug-Free Workplace” policy that required training for employees and supervisors on drug and alcohol abuse. The policy also stated that “use of alcohol or con­trolled substances in the workplace or reporting for work under the influence of alcohol or controlled substances will not be tolerated.”

Following the incident, the Tripps filed a lawsuit against the City, JPD, and the police chief. They argued that JPD was negligent in its hiring, training, and supervision of Bartlett and had a duty to both train Bartlett to manage his alcohol use and train Malone to report other officers’ misconduct. The Tripps’ complaint also argued the JPD had “assumed a duty to reasonably supervise Bartlett’s activities to prevent his alcohol use disorder from posing a danger of harm to the Juneau driving public.” In short, the Tripps claimed JPD had a duty to prevent Bartlett’s drunk driving through training and supervision.

The circuit court granted the defen­dants’ motion to dismiss, finding that JPD did not owe a duty of care to the Tripps. The Tripps appealed.

The Alaska Supreme Court af­firmed the superior court’s dismissal of the case and found no duty for the JPD to train employees against excessive off-duty alcohol consumption. Nor would it find a duty for police officers to report colleagues who engage in such conduct.

The Court considered the issue of whether a duty existed, starting with the Tripps’ contention that certain work rules related to substance abuse imposed a duty on JPD, The Court was unmoved. “None of these provisions, whether read individually or together, evince an intent to impose a duty on JPD to protect the public by training officers not to consume alcohol to excess while off duty.” These rules, the Court found, were designed for the internal function of JPD, not for the safety of the general public outside of the work environment.

Finding no statutory duty, the Court then considered whether prece­dent imposed such a duty, focusing on cases where a voluntary assumption of a duty of care had been found. The Tripps argued that by implementing Conduct Rule 114, JPD gratuitously assumed a duty. The Court found this argument unpersuasive, noting the cases cited by the Tripps involved defendants that “provided them with some sort of aid, thereby inducing them to rely on them for safety.” It distinguished these from JPD’s personnel policy which, it reasoned, did not induce reliance by the public and was instead internal to the department.

The Court then considered whether public policy favored recognition of such a duty. “Training police officers on the dangers of excessive alcohol con­sumption is unlikely to affect whether officers drive drunk while off duty. Officers understand this conduct is illegal and carries grave consequences. It is not foreseeable that a lack of train­ing on excessive alcohol consumption will make officers more likely to drive drunk.” It acknowledged the certainty of the Tripps’ injury but found a distant connection between JPD’s training (or lack thereof) and the harm caused, stating the causal connection was “too attenuated to impose a duty of care on JPD in this instance.” It further found “moral blame in this case lies squarely with Bartlett,” and that the “marginal public safety benefit of training officers not to consume alcohol to excess is like­ly to be scant because officers already know the dangers and consequences of driving while under the influence.”

Tripp v. City & Borough of Juneau, 2025 Alas. LEXIS 8 (Alaska 2025).