Sean Peck, a sergeant in the Philadelphia Police Department, filed suit against his superiors – Lieutenant Megan Bolognone, Deputy Commissioner Krista Dahl-Campbell, and Chief Inspector Michael Cochrane – alleging retaliation under the First Amendment and the Pennsylvania Whistleblower Law. The dispute stemmed from Peck’s internal emails regarding officer attendance issues and potential overtime fraud. Peck claimed his communications exposed misconduct, but his superiors viewed them as part of his routine supervisory duties. After receiving counseling memoranda, a negative performance evaluation, and ultimately a demotion, Peck argued these actions were retaliatory.
The District Court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants, and Peck appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
The Third Circuit affirmed the District Court’s decision, holding that Peck’s speech was not protected under the First Amendment because it fell within the scope of his official duties. The Court emphasized that “speech by government employees receives less protection than speech by members of the public,” and for such speech to be protected, the employee must speak “as a private citizen,” not pursuant to official responsibilities. Peck’s emails, which addressed attendance disputes and overtime concerns, were directly tied to his role as a sergeant, which included completing assignment sheets, managing staffing issues, and ensuring officer timeliness. The Court noted that “dealing with attendance was part of the work Peck was paid to perform on an ordinary basis,” making his communications part of his job rather than protected speech. Even if the emails hinted at fraud, the Court found that “Peck cannot acknowledge that it was his responsibility to stop overtime fraud while simultaneously urging that reporting such fraud to superiors was not his responsibility.”
The Court also rejected Peck’s argument that forwarding his complaints up the chain of command somehow transformed his speech into protected activity. It explained that “complaints up the chain of command typically qualify as speech within an employee’s official duties,” whether directed to a direct supervisor or higher-ranking officials. The absence of any effort to raise concerns outside the workplace further undermined Peck’s claim.
Turning to the Pennsylvania Whistleblower Law claim, the Court found Peck’s emails did not constitute a “good faith report” of wrongdoing, as they lacked specificity about actual violations and instead described “potential or contemplated” misconduct rather than “actual” fraud. Additionally, Peck failed to establish causation between his emails and the alleged retaliation. The Court dismissed his reliance on temporal proximity, stating that “the mere fact that the discharge occurred a few months after a report of wrongdoing is not enough to show a causal connection.” It also noted that Peck’s performance issues – including interpersonal conflicts and safety concerns – predated his emails, further weakening any inference of retaliation.
Peck v. Bolognone, 2025 U.S. App. LEXIS 10530* (3d Cir. 2025)